On January 15, a UK citizen, Malik Faisal Akram, took four people hostage in the Congregation Beth Israel Synagogue in Colleyville, Texas. The gunman, who was ultimately shot and killed in a standoff with police, had previously been investigated in 2020 by British domestic intelligence, MI5, which reportedly concluded he was not a threat. Staff at the Islamic Center of Irving in Texas reported that Akram became angry when his request to spend the night at the center was refused. The center’s staff say they escorted him out and he left after this. U.S. law enforcement agencies are still investigating Akram’s activities and timeline for unaccounted days in the U.S. as well as possible connections in the UK. This includes how he was able to obtain the handgun used in his attack.
Akram’s motivations remain unclear and still being investigated. His reported linking of his attack to the release of Aafia Siddiqui, who is currently imprisoned serving an 86-year federal term in Texas after being convicted for trying to kill members of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, has drawn public attention. Federal prosecutors allege that she was a member of Al-Qaeda, charges her supporters deny. Her case has become an international cause célèbre among some, with groups formed to petition for her release, claiming her to be “innocent” and Pakistani government officials, including Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan, claiming occasionally that they will try to get her released from prison.
Siddiqui’s case and her status at the top of the list of “Muslim female prisoners” held in the jails of “the Crusaders” has remained since her arrest, trial, and imprisonment a regular feature of Sunni jihadi rhetoric and narrative construction. Both Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/IS) and affiliated and allied organizations have demanded her release and attempted to rally the support of Muslims by invoking her name and the names of other “Muslim prisoners.” This is particularly true of Muslim women prisoners, the “honor” of whom Sunni jihadis claim to be avenging when they carry out, or try to carry out, attacks. Siddiqui and other women prisoners (as a general rhetorical group) have and continue to be regularly named as motivations by a host of jihadi ideologues, leaders, and organizations including Al-Qaeda Central’s amir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-Shabab (Al-Shabaab) and its foreign fighters, and the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Jihadi commanders have also proven adept at using the issue of real and reported/perceived abuses of Muslim women, including prisoners, as a tool to re-socialize their followers to accept higher and more egregious types and levels of violence.
This post highlights just a handful of jihadi media and rhetorical narratives about Siddiqui specifically.
(Above): Lyrics from a particularly bad “rap” by the late Omar Hammami concerning Aafia Siddiqui and other Muslim women prisoners.
The article examines 6 cases of Al-Shabaab’s psychological warfare (PSYOPS) & information and influence and information warfare operations:
(1) the group’s January 2020 Manda Bay airfield attack in Kenya on a military base used by U.S. forces;
(2) 2010 Mogadishu stalemate between Al-Shabaab and the African Union & the start of the Somali insurgent group’s new “jihadi journalism media campaign;
(3) 2011 Dayniile ambush by the group killing scores of Burundian African Union troops;
(4) 2014 Mpeketoni raids by Al-Shabaab on a town and its environs in Kenya blamed by the country’s president (falsely) on his political opponents despite clear evidence to the contrary;
(5) Al-Shabaab’s multi-part campaign to sway the outcome of Kenya’s 2017 general elections;
(6) Al-Shabaab’s leader addressing Americans about the use of national resources abroad despite record mass shootings & natural disasters in U.S. during 2019;
In addition to examining the specifics of each case, I look at how Al-Shabaab attempts to broaden the reach of its PSYOPS propaganda products by attracting attention from external news media. Sometimes successful, its success rate is also mixed. Media warfare demonstrates both Al-Shabab’s significant capabilities but also its limitations, particular operationally in its bid to take over the Somali state.
The article can be read online at the CTC Sentinel’sWEBSITE.
A downloadable PDF of the article is available at my Academia.eduprofile page.
Symbolism is central to proto-state jihadi visual culture and media operations campaigns. From flags to uniforms, insignia, posters and billboards, and street and building names and signage, groups like Al-Shabab in Somalia, like nation-states, understand the power of images, language, and the (idealized) framing of history.
Here in photographs taken by Al-Shabab after its temporary capture of the Somali government’s El-Salin (El-Salini) military base in the Lower Shabelle region, the insurgent group juxtaposes victorious militants with defeated (and fallen) Somali National Army soldiers, represented by a fallen or discarded army flag.
Islamic State, in its most the 216th issue of its weekly Al-Naba newsletter, profiled the former deputy amir of its Somalia branch, Shaykh ‘Abdul Hakim Ahmed Ibrahim (‘Abd al-Hakim al-Somali) his name has also been reported as “Abdihakim Mohamed Ibrahim”), covering his “three decades of da’wa (missionary propagation/”calling to God”) and struggle (jihad) in God’s path.” Some of his family members blamed other members of IS-Somalia of killing him at the time as part of a possible power struggle.
Born on the savanna area of eastern Somalia in 1390 Hijri, corresponding to (March 9, 1970 to Feb. 26, 1971), Ibrahim is portrayed as a pious youth who “sought knowledge” and attended the mosques in the port city of Bosaso in the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland where he studied Islam and prayed. He was dedicated to “true monotheism” (tawhid) and the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, rejecting the heretical innovations (bid’a) of local Sufis such as the visitation of the graves and tombs of dead holy men and other shrines. He began his career in the field of missionary propagation (da’wa) by trying to get his family members and fellow clansmen to abandon bid’a and begin practicing “true” Islam. He and his companions then began to conduct da’wa in the Somali-majority region of Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia.
He was an active supporter of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) umbrella and adopted a militant/armed stance with regard to his da’wa activities when he faced opposition from “apostates,” exhorting his audiences to fulfill their duty of military jihad. He and his “brothers, the monotheists” (muwahhidun) worked tirelessly as righteous reformers (ahl al-salah) to fight the corruption from the Sufi spreaders of corruption and sedition (ahl al-fasad min al-Sufiyya).
Following the Ethiopian (Christian) invasion and the collapse of the UIC after its military defeat, Ibrahim’s and his companions’ efforts were betrayed by the “apostate” Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-murtaddin), which eventually allied with Somali Sufis, other Muslims in error (ahl al-dalal) as well as the “Crusaders.”
Following the collapse of the UIC and the occupation of parts of Somalia by Ethiopia, Ibrahim met young Somali “mujahidin” seeking to migrate (hijra) to Yemen, one of the other “arenas of jihad,” the travel routes of which ran through northeastern Somalia/Puntland, specifically the coastal Bargal area.
After a small group of 11 Somali mujahidin were attacked in an airstrike, Ibrahim successfully helped them escape a blockade by “apostates,” evacuating them to Yemen by sea.
He joined Al-Shabab, which at the time, the Al-Naba article acknowledges, was the best insurgent factions in Somalia (afdal al-fasa’il al-muqatila al-mawjuda fi-l-Sumal). Unlike other members of Al-Shabab, though, Ibrahim was dedicated only to tawhid and the Prophet’s sunna and was not corrupted by “pre-Islamic” clannism or “regional” loyalties). He was dispatched to Puntland by Al-Shabab commanders as part of “security detachments” (mafariz amniyya) operating against Somali “apostate” government forces.
In Puntland he participated in the attempted assassination of “one of the biggest agents of the Crusaders, Diyano,” probably Puntland senior military commander Asad Osman Diyano. Diyano survived though several of his companions were killed or wounded.
The article said that Ibrahim was eager to strengthen jihadi efforts in Puntland while the bulk of Al-Shabab remained focused on southern (and central) Somalia. He requested a meeting with the group’s leadership in order to lay out his plan and his reasons to widen military operations in northeastern Somalia. He ended up spending nearly two years fighting in the south before returning to Puntland. He gained experience in procuring weapons and ammunition, a skill that would prove helpful later on.
Ibrahim took the decision to join the “unified community of the Muslims” (jama’at al-Muslimin) after observing events in Syria, chiefly the betrayals of the “mujahidin” by Al-Qa’ida and its amir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and its allies in the “apostate” Ikhwan and the Sururiyya. He and many of his friends were inspired by the expansion of Islamic State.
They saw joining Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s group as being a religious duty because of Islamic State’s implementation of shari’a and establishment of an Islamic state, culminating in the declaration of a caliph-imam to unite the Umma. Ibrahim and his companions started to engage in da’wa to convince others to pledge allegiance (bay’a) to al-Baghdadi and reject divisions between the different mujahidin factions that had “torn apart the mujahidin.” The martyrology, unsurprisingly, said that he was successful and convinced many mujahidin to pledge bay’a and abandon their membership in their previous groups.
However, Al-Shabab’s leadership mocked Ibrahim and the other defectors, with the article alleging that Al-Shabab’s commanders had become used to being subordinate to Al-Qa’ida, which led them to religious discord (fitna) and mixing unbelief (kufr) and heretical innovation (bid’a) despite this going against the tenets and requirements of Islam. The biography says that Al-Shabab’s leadership at that time began to dispatch intelligence agents (“spies”), presumably from the feared Amniyat security wing, to tail Ibrahim and other Islamic State sympathizers.
Al-Shabab, the article details, started open repression once a public bay’a was declared by one group, seemingly referring to Shaykh ‘Abdi Qadir Mu’min’s faction in Puntland in late October 2015. Al-Shabab arrested and imprisoned or killed Islamic State sympathizers and defectors. The article equates Al-Shabab’s actions against Islamic State and its loyalists in Somalia with a theological offense against Islam itself. The repression was particularly bad, the article said, in southern Somalia.
The article says, however, that Al-Shabab arrested anyone suspected of sympathizing with Islamic State and not only actual sympathizers, an allegation previously made by other anti-Shabab jihadis. Anyone who even watched a video or listened to a nashid produced by one of Islamic State’s media outlets was arrested or killed by Al-Shabab, the article claims.
Ibrahim was, the biography claimed, one of the first to join Islamic State in Somalia and defect from the “evil, criminal” Al-Shabab. The fact that he was based in Puntland far from Al-Shabab’s strongest forces helped him and this allowed him to more securely engage in da’wa to win over more defectors to Islamic State-Somalia. Al-Shabab tried to prevent recruits from traveling to Puntland but God intervened for the emigrants (muhajirin) and protected many of them. Ibrahim was instrumental in securing weapons, ammunition, and other equipment for the new recruits, enabling them to restart their jihad anew.
As a soldier among the “caliphate’s” soldiers (jundi min junud al-Khilafa) Ibrahim was at the forefront of IS-Somalia’s clan outreach, inviting them to enlist their children, and he was, the article claims, successful because of his good reputation in the region.
Following IS-Somalia’s capture and occupation of the port town of Qandala in October 2016 Ibrahim participated in the battles between Mu’min’s insurgents and Puntland government and allied clan forces. Ibrahim was protected by God and was away from his brothers in IS-Somalia when Al-Shabab sent a force of several hundred to eradicate IS-Somalia (the force was instead soundly defeated by a coalition of of Puntland and Galmudug government forces and allied clan militias near Gara’ad.)
Ibrahim remained a key player in IS-Somalia and its campaign against the “apostate” soldiers of al-Zawahiri (junud al-Zawahiri al-murtaddin), humiliating Al-Shabab and helped swell the ranks of IS-Somalia by the hundreds.
With his growing formidable reputation in Puntland, however, came dangers as Ibrahim came to the attention of the “Crusaders” (U.S.) and their Somali “apostate” allies. He was targeted and killed in a drone missile strike in Rajab 1440 Hijri, corresponding to March 8 to April 6, 2019. The biography defends Ibrahim’s reputation from claims by Al-Qa’ida and Al-Shabab that tried to sully his memory by seeking to link him to the enemies of Islam. The death date window given differs slightly from U.S. AFRICOM’s date of April 14, 2019 noted in its press release announcing his killing.
A core duty of all Muslims collectively is to “enjoin (command) the good and forbid the wrong” (amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar), meaning that they should encourage fellow believers to live ethical and pious lives while warding the latter away from practices and actions or behavior that contradict the core tenets of Islam. This concept, which has been exhaustively covered by Professor Michael Cook in a monumental book, is mentioned explicitly or thematically in both the Qur’an (e.g. 3:104, 3:110, 31:17, 22:40-41, ] and collections of hadith, including an often-cited one narrated by the Medinan sahabi Sa’ad bin Malik bin Sinan al-Khazraji al-Khudri (Abu Sa’id al-Khudri).
The concept of amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar is a favorite of modern day militant Islamists (jihadis) who cite it as a blanket justification, in their eyes though not that of the vast majority of the world’s Muslims regardless of school of thought or sect, for their actions against other people who are themselves Muslims. For example, crackdowns on the selling and consumption of alcohol, cigarettes and other tobacco products, and movies and music deemed to be “un-Islamic” are justified by these groups with this interpretation of the Qur’anic and Prophetic injunction.
Here the Somali jihadi-insurgent organization Al-Shabab gathers local civilians to watch the proto-state group destroy seized cigarettes and other tobacco products as well as qat/khat (“jaad”), a plant with leaves that is popular in Somalia, Yemen, Oman, and other countries in the Horn of Africa but is banned in places including the U.S. and Great Britain. In the U.S. it is banned for having both a Schedule I and Schedule IV stimulants; also classified in Schedule I are heroin, LSD, Ecstasy, and marijuana. Al-Shabab has long banned the use of qat in areas under its control though the enforcement of such bans have varied from time to time and place to place.
The public enforcement of such edicts is a performative, ritualized display of the jihadi proto-state’s claims to both governing authority, that is being able to enact and enforce the ban, and to religio-historical legitimacy through the demonstration of its theological “purity.”
A favorite hadith of Sunni militant Islamist (jihadi) organizations: “Military garrisoning (ribat) [and jihad to protect the frontiers] in the path of God is better than one thousand days in one of life’s other stations [in prayer and fulfilling other religious obligations],” included in in the 13th century jurist and hadith scholar (muhaddith) al-Nawawi’s Riyad al-Salihin collection, here cited by the late Al-Shabab amir, Ahmed “Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr” Godane against the backdrop of insurgents following their mid-October 2018 capture of a Somali government military base in Daynunai, Bay region.
A selection of visual materials produced independently by Sunni jihadis and their supporters drawing upon American military and pop culture themes including the U.S. Marines’ slogan, the iconic posed Iwo Jima flag-raising photograph from the Second World War, and the HBO miniseries Band of Brothers (which is when those two posters were produced).
The images in these posters include the late Shaykh ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, the late Saudi foreign fighter commander in Chechnya and the North Caucasus Abu al-Walid al-Ghamdi, Al-Shabab spokesman and official ‘Ali Mohamud Rage (‘Ali Dheere), and the then-Al-Shabaab officials Mukhtar “Abu Mansur” Robow and Hasan Dahir Aweys.