Screenshots from an elegiac film about the previous amir of the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Mawlana Fazlullah, who was killed by a U.S. drone in June 2018. Fazlullah is shown speaking to TTP members and locals, firing weapons, leading congregational prayers, offering supplicatory prayer (du’a), meeting with other TTP leaders, and preparing for ‘Eid al-Adha.
Fazlullah pledges allegiance (bay’a) to the leadership of the Afghan Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan).
On January 15, a UK citizen, Malik Faisal Akram, took four people hostage in the Congregation Beth Israel Synagogue in Colleyville, Texas. The gunman, who was ultimately shot and killed in a standoff with police, had previously been investigated in 2020 by British domestic intelligence, MI5, which reportedly concluded he was not a threat. Staff at the Islamic Center of Irving in Texas reported that Akram became angry when his request to spend the night at the center was refused. The center’s staff say they escorted him out and he left after this. U.S. law enforcement agencies are still investigating Akram’s activities and timeline for unaccounted days in the U.S. as well as possible connections in the UK. This includes how he was able to obtain the handgun used in his attack.
Akram’s motivations remain unclear and still being investigated. His reported linking of his attack to the release of Aafia Siddiqui, who is currently imprisoned serving an 86-year federal term in Texas after being convicted for trying to kill members of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, has drawn public attention. Federal prosecutors allege that she was a member of Al-Qaeda, charges her supporters deny. Her case has become an international cause célèbre among some, with groups formed to petition for her release, claiming her to be “innocent” and Pakistani government officials, including Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan, claiming occasionally that they will try to get her released from prison.
Siddiqui’s case and her status at the top of the list of “Muslim female prisoners” held in the jails of “the Crusaders” has remained since her arrest, trial, and imprisonment a regular feature of Sunni jihadi rhetoric and narrative construction. Both Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/IS) and affiliated and allied organizations have demanded her release and attempted to rally the support of Muslims by invoking her name and the names of other “Muslim prisoners.” This is particularly true of Muslim women prisoners, the “honor” of whom Sunni jihadis claim to be avenging when they carry out, or try to carry out, attacks. Siddiqui and other women prisoners (as a general rhetorical group) have and continue to be regularly named as motivations by a host of jihadi ideologues, leaders, and organizations including Al-Qaeda Central’s amir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-Shabab (Al-Shabaab) and its foreign fighters, and the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Jihadi commanders have also proven adept at using the issue of real and reported/perceived abuses of Muslim women, including prisoners, as a tool to re-socialize their followers to accept higher and more egregious types and levels of violence.
This post highlights just a handful of jihadi media and rhetorical narratives about Siddiqui specifically.
(Above): Lyrics from a particularly bad “rap” by the late Omar Hammami concerning Aafia Siddiqui and other Muslim women prisoners.
South Asian Sunni jihadis are marking the 12th anniversary of the July 3-11, 2007 siege of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad by Pakistani government forces, which were responding to increasing violent activism by male and female students at the mosque’s two schools including its now famous women’s madrasa, Jami’a Hafsa. These groups include pro-Al-Qaeda and Islamic State militants as well as Pakistan and Kashmir-centered groups including the sectarian Lashkar-e Jhangvi.
The mosque’s deputy imam, ‘Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who was killed during the siege, became a central “martyr” figure in Sunni jihadi visual and literary cultures, particularly but not only to South Asian groups. Different factions of the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Islamic Jihad Union have named military attacks or campaigns and special units after him or in memory of the scores of students and others killed during the siege by government forces. Ghazi and the other martyrs were eulogized by Al-Qaeda Central (AQC) and other major jihadi groups and figures, with Ayman al-Zawahiri and the late AQC leader Abu Yahya al-Libi placing him in the pantheon of the “mujahid ‘ulama” who, they said, are exemplary figures for the Umma.
The 189th issue of Islamic State’s weekly Al-Naba newsletter included an interesting and detailed profile highlighting the importance of individuals with formal religious studies expertise. They are particularly important for the militant organization and its regional affiliates and branches due to their often lack of many credentialed, highly educated religious scholars.
The article highlights one of Wilayat Khurasan’s “shining” religious scholars (‘ulama) & late wali (governor), Abu ‘Umayr ‘Abd al-Hasib al-Logari, who ascended to the top of Wilayat Khurasan after the July 2016 drone killing of Hafiz Sa’id Khan, heralding the former’s leadership during “one of the most difficult periods” for the “Province.” Wilayat Khurasan is the Afghanistan branch/affiliate of IS’ core organization. It maintains connections with the core while also having its own set of local and regional dynamics and interests. ‘Abd al-Hasib is referred to as a hadith scholar (muhaddith).
Born in Kurram agency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, ‘Abd al-Hasib studied extensively Arabic, Persian, & English in addition to his native fluency in Pashto and Urdu. He formally studied Islamic law & fiqh with a hadith specialization for 8 years at the Jami’a Imam Bukhari & then studied the Six Books (canonical Sunni collections: Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abu Dawud, Jami’ al-Tirmidhi, Sunan al-Nasa’i) at the Ganj Madrasa in Peshawar for 4 years.
After completing his studies, he decided to travel to Afghanistan to join the battle against “polytheism” (shirk) & “Sufism” (tasawwuf), spreading the “true” message of absolute monotheism (Tawhid).
He taught shari’a & fiqh for two years as member of the Afghan Taliban before leaving with defectors & TTP commanders who accused their rivals of being linked to the “apostate” Pakistani government, serving as a deputy to founding wali, Hafiz Sa’id Khan.
As Khurasan wali, ‘Abd al-Hasib he participated in fighting the “Crusaders” on the frontlines of Nangarhar in ribat & established the proto-state governing offices (dawawin, diwans) of the Wilayat.
Despite his leadership duties, he also continued his role of religious teaching & preaching, spreading “Tawhid” & the “loyalty & disavowal” (al-wala min al-mu’minin wa-l-bara ‘an al-kafirin) among locals. He died in battle against U.S. forces on April 27, 2017.